New Notice Requirement Regarding Negative Comments in Personnel Files Create Uncertainty for Employers

September 8th, 2010

Massachusetts recently enacted an important change for employers regarding their duties concerning the maintenance of personnel records. The law, passed just days ago, is effective retroactively to August 1.

Bottom line, the new law modifies the state Personnel Records Statute. That statute formerly required the employer simply to provide a copy of a personnel file to an employee requesting to inspect his or her file in writing and to allow employees to make responsive comments to statements contained therein. The new law now requires employers to notify an employee within 10 days of when negative information is entered into his or her personnel record and to allow employees to inspect their files upon notice of such information.

The definition of “personnel records” is broadly defined under Massachusetts law. The definition expressly covers any record that has or may affect the employee’s qualifications for employment, promotion, transfer, additional compensation, or disciplinary action.

So, any time an employer places negative information in an employee’s personnel file that can be used to make a decision affecting the employee’s qualification for employment, promotion, transfer, additional compensation, or disciplinary action, the employer must now tell the employee about such information within 10 days of it being placed in the personnel file. In addition, employers, must allow employees to inspect their personnel records each time such notification is provided.

HR professionals generally argue that best practice calls for providing notice to employees regarding negative information such as performance reviews or disciplinary notices, etc. Indeed, in the past, putting negative information in an employee’s personnel file without giving notice to the employee would have provided the employer with marginal if any benefit at all in the event of litigation. The credibility of any negative information is generally suspect if it is included without notice to the employee.

That said, one wonders if the new requirement might encourage some employers, whether lawfully or not, to keep a “shadow file” in addition to the personnel file for working use until they develop more formal documentation for submission to the personnel file and for notice to the employee. Such “shadow” files, or notes to the file without notice to the employee, can often backfire against the employer in litigation and now may well be unlawful if used when making employment decisions.

The law essentially tries to enact best practices. Whether it will encourage poor practice remains to be seen. In the meantime, employers should balance the risks of violation against the increased workload of stringent compliance. Among other things, violations of the new law can result in fines between $500 and $2,500.

Reid v. Google: A Game-Changer?

August 27th, 2010

California has struck again in Reid v. Google.  A simple age discrimination lawsuit involving 54 year-old Brian Reid, Google, and the term “old fuddy-duddy” might have possibly changed the landscape of discrimination lawsuits.  Reid sued Google for allegedly firing him because of his age.  He claimed his co-workers called him an “old fuddy-duddy” in 2004.

After a six-year legal battle with Google, the California Supreme Court ruled earlier this month that Reid’s lawsuit deserves to go to trial.  But more interesting, however, is that the court concluded he could base his claim on what his colleagues call “stray remarks.”

Reid says that, behind his back, coworkers called him “an old man,” “slow,” “lethargic,” and “sluggish.”  He also claims coworkers said his compact disc cases should be labeled “LPs” instead of “CDs.”

Courts have traditionally held that such remarks cannot support discrimination complaints.  In age discrimination cases, plaintiffs frequently support their claims with evidence of comments and remarks by managers or supervisors such as referring to some employees as “old timers.”  But when such comments are made by co-workers—who are not involved in the decision to terminate the affected employee—or in a context unrelated to the decision, courts brand them as mere “stray remarks” that are not evidence of discrimination.

The California Supreme Court, however, held in Reid v. Google that such “stray remarks” cannot be “categorically” dismissed from consideration.  Instead, the Court explained that, although such remarks may not, alone, be persuasive, they can support a discrimination claim when combined with other evidence.  When deciding whether to grant or deny summary judgment, courts must analyze the “totality of circumstances.” 

Courts do apply the “stray remarks” doctrine on a case-by-case basis, but the Court’s holding here elevates the role of such remarks to a level higher than mere fact-specific analysis.  Indeed, when something cannot be “categorically” dismissed, it is forever in play.

The other evidence in this case is fairly intriguing.  Reid’s 38-year-old supervisor told him on several occasions that his ideas were “too old to matter.”  Google had hired Reid in 2002 when he was 52.  A year later, his performance review said Reid “projected confidence when dealing with fast changing situations,” “had an excellent attitude,” was “very intelligent” and “a terrific problem solver,” and that he “consistently met expectations.”  The following year, Google fired Reid because he was allegedly “not a cultural fit.”

Google “culture” is, indeed, rather unique.  Census data shows that, in the computer industry in Santa Clara County where Google is located, only nine percent of workers are 50 or older. 

Another interesting tidbit: Google fired Reid one year before Google went public, which cost Reid 131,917 stock options that would have been worth tens of millions of dollars.     

Whatever the evidence, Reid v. Google should alert employers that, to protect themselves from liability, they must make all reasonable efforts to eliminate all politically incorrect references from the office.

Recent Developments in New Hampshire Law

August 16th, 2010

The following recent developments in New Hampshire law relate specifically to and impact employers:

SB 416 (Effective July 8, 2010)

Senate Bill 416 is the most interesting of these changes in New Hampshire law because it clarifies the applicability of the state minimum hourly wage to tipped restaurant employees.  It amends the introductory paragraph of RSA 279:21 to include within the definition of a “Restaurant” the following: “an establishment in a temporary or permanent building, kept, used, maintained, advertised, and held out to the public to be a place where meals are regularly prepared or served for which a charge is made and where seating and table service is available for customers or where delivery services are available.”  The bill also includes, within the definition of “Tipped employees,” the following: “employees who deliver meals prepared in a restaurant to the customer’s home, office, or other location.”  Thus, under the bill, pizza delivery businesses would be able to cut their drivers’ wages in half because they can classify such drivers as tipped employees, and the minimum wage for such workers is 45 percent of the minimum wage.

SB 358 (Effective July 20, 2010)

Senate Bill 358 amends RSA 275-E and concerns whistleblower protection and waste prevention in state government.  Specifically, it expands the provisions of the whistleblower protection act to include employees who object to or refuse to participate in any activity that the employee believes is a violation of law.  This bill also authorizes the labor commissioner to investigate allegations of fraud, abuse, or waste in the expenditure of public funds and adds additional protections to the whistleblower protection act for public employees who file such complaints.  Thus, the bill expands whistleblower protections for public employees by allowing them to expose waste, fraud, and abuse of public funds without fear of retribution.

HB 1137 (Effective August 13, 2010)

House Bill 1137 amends RSA 275:48, I(b)(9) and (10) by adding to the purposes for which employers may withhold a portion of an employee’s wages.  Specifically, employers may withhold wages for “[l]egal plans and identity theft plans without financial advantage to the employer when the employee has given his or her written authorization and deductions are duly recorded.”  Thus, under HB 1137, workers—if their employers adopt the program—would be able to prepay for legal services through payroll deductions just as they can prepay for health benefits or day care.

These developments in New Hampshire law will have an immediate impact on businesses, so employers should consult their counsel and determine how these new laws specifically affect them.

Massachusetts Maternity Leave Act Protection Limited To Eight Weeks

August 10th, 2010

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled, in a 4-to-3 decision yesterday, that women in Massachusetts who work full time for small businesses can get their jobs back after eight weeks of maternity leave, but the Massachusetts Maternity Leave Act does not protect them beyond that time.

“A female employee is only entitled to MMLA rights when she is absent from employment for no more than eight weeks,” Justice Francis X. Spina wrote for the Court.

The Court did state, however, that women who are promised longer maternity leaves by their employers—either through collective bargaining agreements or company policy—can sue for breach or contract if their employer later reneges and fires them.  But they do not have any protection under state law (the Massachusetts Maternity Leave Act) after eight weeks.

In the case, Sandy Stephens, a housekeeper for the president of Global NAPs Inc., a small Quincy, MA telecommunications firm, claimed her supervisor told her that, if she gave birth by cesarean section, she could take unpaid maternity leave longer than eight weeks.  Stephens ultimately gave birth by cesarean section and claimed that, when she called her supervisor and anticipated returning to work after around 11 weeks, she learned her employer had fired her.

Stephens sued and alleged that her employer and its president violated the Massachusetts Maternity Leave Act by firing her while she was on maternity leave.  She cited a guideline of the Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination, which enforces the law, that says employers should notify employees in writing if they do not plan to guarantee benefits beyond eight weeks.  The SJC found, however, that the guideline is merely advisory and does not have the force of law.

“Once a female employee is absent from employment for more than eight weeks, she is no longer within the purview of the [Massachusetts Maternity Leave Act] and, consequently, is not afforded the protections conferred by the statute,’’ Justice Spina wrote for the majority.  

The decision affirmed how the law has generally been applied, and John J. Barter, a Boston lawyer who represented Global NAPs, praised the ruling as a victory for business interests.

The ruling is limited to women whose maternity leave falls under state law (typically those who work at smaller companies but with at least six employees).  Women who work for employers with 50 or more employees are covered by the federal Family and Medical Leave Act, which provides up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave and job protection.  The ruling does not affect the federal law.

This decision should put both employees and employers on notice.  On one hand, women should expect no more than eight weeks of maternity leave.  As Barter said, “[t]he court concluded that the law says eight weeks—and eight weeks means eight weeks—so the statute controls.”  On the other hand, the decision removes some liability from employers, but they should pay attention to Justice Margot Botsford’s words in her dissent.  Indeed, while employers who renege on promises to women of more than eight weeks of maternity leave may not have any liability under the Massachusetts Maternity Leave Act, they still should not use the law to employ a bait-and-switch with employees because they can, nevertheless, find themselves in court facing common law claims such breach of contract.

How to Write an Employee Handbook: Creating an Employee Handbook Doesn’t Have to be Hard

August 4th, 2010

Many employers encounter difficulty with how to write an employee handbook for their businesses, but, in reality, creating an employee handbook is not all that difficult.  The key is to know what to include in it.

Having a handbook with established policies and procedures will eliminate confusion about what you expect from your employees and what they should expect from you.  Whether you are the owner of a small business and write the handbook yourself or hand over the job to a large human resources department, make sure you decide on the policies and procedures beforehand and express them in a simple, direct, and unambiguous manner.  Each employee should receive a copy of the handbook at the beginning of his or her employment. 

If you are wondering how to write an employee handbook, the following policies, procedures, and explanations are what you should include in it:

Introduction

  • Welcome the employee.
  • Provide a brief history of the company.
  • Company’s goals, values, beliefs, and philosophy.

Employee Acknowledgment Form

  • Employee should know it is his/her responsibility to read and understand handbook.
  • Acknowledgment should be at beginning of handbook.
  • Awareness of importance of handbook ensures employees read it.
  • Helps avoid future “I didn’t know about it” conversations.
  • Include a disclaimer that the employee handbook is not an employment contract between the employee and the company.

Equal Employment Opportunity Statement

  • Outline of company’s policy regarding equal employment opportunity.
  • No equal employment opportunity statement sends the wrong message.
  • Include reference to affirmative action policy here (if applicable).

General Policies

  • Attendance: a general statement about tardiness and expectations and procedure for requests for time off.
  • Confidentiality: policy regarding protection against disclosure of confidential business information; describe information considered confidential
  • Covenants Not To Compete: make sure the law in your state allows such covenants.
  • Data Privacy: protection of personal information; refer to written comprehensive information security program.
  • Dress Code: description of requirements regarding clothing, uniforms, etc.
  • Employment Categories: outline of varieties of employment categories (full-time vs. part-time) and provide disclaimer (if applicable) that employees are at-will employees and, thus, may be dismissed at any time at the company’s discretion; job descriptions, however, should be set forth in a separate document.
  • Parking: identify any applicable policy or procedure.
  • Performance Reviews: essential if problems ever arise with employee; no need for description of process but should address when reviews occur.
  • Safety & Accidents: refer to relevant documents (safety posters, emergency procedures, etc.) and periodic employee training.
  • Smoking: laws and building rules regarding smoking.
  • Social Media: expectations regarding employee behavior on blogs, message boards, Facebook, Twitter, etc.; all content posted on websites should be subject to company policies
  • Substance Abuse: outline of policy, requirements for testing, and disciplinary process.
  • Use of Employer or Company Property: description of reasonable use of company telephones and computers so long as no interference with business; no unauthorized use of Internet.
  • Work schedules (if applicable): define procedures for and information regarding schedules.
  • Additional Policies: outline other applicable policies, including employment verification requests from outside sources, breaks, job posting program, adverse weather instructions, solicitation guidelines, and whistle blower protection

Compensation & Benefits

  • Payroll: outline of payroll processing options (e.g., direct deposit) and pay periods (weekly, bi-weekly, number of pay periods).
  • Work Hours & Reporting: definition of work day and information regarding overtime.
  • Holidays: list days company recognizes as holidays and define how employees are paid for holidays.
  • Vacation & Personal Days: define who is eligible, the rate at which vacation accrues, carry-over policy (if applicable), requirements for requesting vacation and personal days, and unused vacation if employee leaves company.
  • Health Insurance: overview of coverage and who is eligible; refer to separate documentation.
  • COBRA: refer to continuation of health benefits; keep full explanation in documentation provided to employee upon leaving company.
  • Short-Term Disability: define policy and who is eligible.
  • Military Service: define who is eligible, and outline policy and requirements.
  • Retirement Plans: provide brief description of plan; refer to plan documents.
  • Worker’s Compensation: identify whether company has worker’s compensation insurance; refer to separate documentation.
  • Tuition Assistance: define policy, requirements, and who is eligible.
  • Employee Assistance: provide brief description of program and applicable telephone number.
  • Other Benefits: outline other applicable compensation and/or benefits, including information about credit unions, employee referral programs, idea incentives, service awards, employee purchases of company goods/services, and annual physical exams and blood screening.

Discrimination & Harassment

  • Discrimination and Sexual Harassment: describe policy against discrimination and harassment, and outline procedures for company response to complaints.

Leaves of Absence

  • Family and Medical Leave Act (if applicable): applies to businesses with 50 or more employees; explain and address benefits and requirements under FMLA and state laws.
  • Maternity Leave: identify who is eligible and amount of time allowed and rate of pay during absence.
  • Sick Leave: outline policy but ensure that it is consistent with vacation, FMLA, maternity leave, and short-term disability policies; there are no legal requirements for sick leave, but 3 to 10 days of paid sick leave per year is common.
  • Funeral Leave: identify type of family member (immediate or extended family) for which whose death leave is allowed and amount of time allowed.
  • Jury Duty: a good idea to include; identify relationship between rate of pay and court compensation and requirement of proof of service.

If you end up ultimately creating an employee handbook yourself, make sure you have your attorney review it so that it is consistent with federal, state, and local laws. 

Employee handbooks are very helpful because they communicate an employer’s expectations to an employee and help employers run their businesses predictably and consistently.  They also remove any worries or confusion regarding policies, procedures, and benefits and, instead, help focus employees on performance and production.

How to write an employee handbook is less complicated than you think, and it will prove rewarding for both the employer and the employee.

DOL Offers Details on Rule Requiring Breaks for Nursing Mothers

July 30th, 2010

The health care reform legislation passed in March included an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act that now requires employers to provide breaks to nursing mothers to pump breast milk for a one year period after giving birth to a child. The U.S. Department of Labor recently issued a fact sheet detailing employers’ obligations under this amendment to Section 7 of the FLSA.

Under the amended law, qualifying employees are entitled to a reasonable amount of break time to express milk as frequently as required by the nursing mother. The employer must provide its nursing employee with a private space, other than a bathroom, that is shielded from view, free from intrusion by others, and functional as a space in which to express milk.

This new requirement applies only to employees who are not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime pay requirements. Employers do not need to compensate nursing mothers for breaks taken to express milk, but if they already provide compensated breaks, a nursing mother who uses that time to express milk must be compensated like any other employee.

Upper Crust Wage Violation Investigation Provides A Lesson

July 26th, 2010

The U.S. Department of Labor has launched a new investigation of wage law violations related to the disbursement of DOL ordered overtime reimbursement by the Upper Crust pizzeria chain, which has 17 Massachusetts restaurants. Last year, the DOL ordered Upper Crust to pay over $340,000 to 121 workers for its failure to pay at the time-and-a-half rate for work over the 40 hour overtime threshold. This investigation comes on the heels of a lawsuit by former cooks accusing Upper Crust of deducting the compensation for the overtime reimbursement from their paychecks.

The example of Upper Crust should serve as a reminder of the importance of compliance with federal wage and hour laws in the restaurant industry. Restaurants should be particularly careful to maintain thorough records of wage history in order to demonstrate past compliance in the event of a complaint and/or investigation.

Massachusetts SJC Upholds Limits on Employer Liability for Employees’ Bad Acts

July 16th, 2010

A recent Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opinion reaffirmed the limits of employer liability for employees’ actions outside the scope of employment. In Lev v. Beverly Enterprises-Massachusetts, the Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer, ruling against the plaintiff who had been hit by a car driven by an intoxicated Beverly employee who was driving home in his own car after meeting at a restaurant with his supervisor to socialize and discuss work-related issues, during which time he consumed alcohol. The plaintiff had brought claims that (i) Beverly was vicariously liable for the employee’s negligence based on their employment relationship and (ii) that Beverly was liable under traditional negligence theories because it owed a duty to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff argued that Beverly should be vicariously liable for the employee’s negligence on the grounds that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment when he became intoxicated while meeting with his supervisor. The SJC rejected this argument, citing the precedent that travel to and from employment falls outside the scope of employment. When he was driving, the employee was no longer serving his employer and the employer is not liable for his actions.

The SJC also held that Beverly owed no common law duty to the plaintiff, rebuffing the plaintiff’s argument that the employer’s special relationship to its employees and ability to exercise control over them carried with it a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent the employee from consuming alcohol and from driving while intoxicated. The Court reasoned that an employer cannot be expected to foresee and take affirmative action to protect all potential plaintiff’s from an employee’s bad conduct. Based on its conclusion that Beverly owed the plaintiff no duty, the Court declined to credit Beverly’s substance, drug, and alcohol abused policy as setting forth a duty of care standard.

Overall, the SJC clearly confirmed the limits on the ability to bring actions alleging an employer’s liability for employees’ actions that harm plaintiffs based on a reluctance to impose “a potentially onerous burden” on employers to monitor their employees’ off-the-job conduct.

DOL clarifies FMLA eligibility for non-traditional families

July 9th, 2010

The Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor recently issued guidance on the definition of “son or daughter” aimed at members of non-traditional families seeking FMLA eligibility to take approved leave for the birth or adoption of a child, to care for a newborn or newly-placed child, or to care for a child with a serious health condition. This guidance provides an expansive definition of the parent-child relationship by including circumstances where there is no biological or legal parent-child relationship, but the employee has a caregiving relationship, nonetheless.

The FMLA language defines a “son or daughter” as a “biological, adopted, or foster child, a stepchild, a legal ward, or a child of a person standing in loco parentis [. . .].” The DOL guidance states that an employee may stand in loco parentis to a child if s/he has either day-to-day responsibilities to care for the child or provides financial support. The in loco parentis analysis is a fact-specific one that looks to the age of the child, the degree to which the child is dependent on the employee, the amount of support provided by the employee, and the degree to which the employee exercises duties regularly associated with parenthood. Neither the FMLA nor regulations restrict the number of “parents” a child may have for FMLA purposes.

Where an employer is unsure if an employee’s relationship to a child supports FMLA eligibility, the employer may require reasonable documentation of the family relationship, which can be satisfied by a simple statement asserting that the requisite caregiving relationship exists for in loco parentis situations for which there is no legal documentation.

DNH Weighs in on Permissibility of ADA Employment Discrimination Cases

July 1st, 2010

In Skinner v. Salem School District, Judge Laplante of the District of New Hampshire recently considered whether one may bring Title II ADA employment discrimination cases based on disability discrimination or if such claims must be brought under Title I. The employer school district moved for a judgment on the pleadings based on its argument that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act could not be used by its former employee to bring an employment discrimination claim. The Court denied the employer’s motion for lack of support for the principle that the statute clearly excludes employment discrimination claims.

The Court commented on the current circuit split on this issue. The 11th Circuit has held that the DOJ’s regulatory construction allowing ADA employment discrimination cases deserves sufficient deference to permit such cases to go to trial. The 9th Circuit has rejected this view, stating that the overall construction and purpose of the ADA forecloses the view that Congress intended Title II to apply in the employment context. The 1st Circuit has not taken a clear view on the issue. As a result, Judge Laplante refused to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings due to the ambiguity of the law as it currently stands, even though he expressed an affinity for the 9th Circuit view. This leaves the door open for ADA employment discrimination cases to proceed to trial in the 1st Circuit – at least until the “ambiguity” is resolved by a Supreme Court or circuit ruling on the issue.

FLSA Class Action Facing Hofstra

June 25th, 2010

A federal judge in New York certified a class in a pending class action against Hofstra University when it ruled that Hofstra student-employees had sufficiently demonstrated a factual nexus between the named plaintiffs to an FLSA suit and the proposed putative class members to support a determination that they were subject to Hofstra University’s common policy of classifying undergraduate and graduate assistants as exempt or otherwise excluded from provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).  Hofstra’s policy allegedly resulted in the practice of permitting subminimum wage labor and/or unpaid overtime compensation to student-employees in violation of the FLSA, thereby justifying the class action against the university.

Supreme Court Rules Police Department’s Search of Employee Text Messages Reasonable

June 22nd, 2010

            Last week, the Supreme Court ruled that the Ontario, California Police Department acted reasonably in reading employee text messages to determine if City pagers were being used primarily for work purposes.  The unanimous decision, in Quon v. City of Ontario, will have implications for the privacy rights of both public and private employees. 

The City purchased pagers capable of sending and receiving text messages and a data plan that permitted each pager to send or receive a finite number of characters per month, with overage charges for additional messaging.  The city’s privacy policy stated “[u]sers should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality” in network activity such as internet and e-mail use.  Though the policy did not explicitly cover the pagers, the Police Department orally represented at a meeting (which plaintiff Jeff Quon attended) that the policy applied to the pagers.

After one or two billing cycles indicated that some officers, including Quon, were exceeding their character limits, a Police Lieutenant told Quon and other officers that the Department would not audit (i.e. read) the messages to determine if they were work-related if the officers’ personally paid their overage fees.  Later, after the lieutenant “had become tired of being a bill collector,” the Chief of Police decided to determine whether the character limit was too low for official business, or whether the overages were the result of personal use.  To do that, the Chief ordered a review of two months in which Quon and another officer had overages to determine the reason for those overages.  Ultimately, a Department report found that of the 456 messages Quon send during work hours in August 2002, only 57 were work-related.  In fact, many turned out to be sexually explicit communications made to his now ex-wife and a female officer with whom Quon had been having an affair.

Quon and others sued the Department, among others, alleging the search violated his reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages protected by Fourth Amendment.  After a jury trial, the federal trial court found no violation of Quon’s Fourth Amendment rights, noting that the jury had found the purpose of the search was not to investigate Quon, but rather to evaluate Department policy (i.e. whether the character limit was too low).  As we have previously blogged, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and there were “a host of simple ways” to conduct a less intrusive audit, “such as warning Quon at the beginning of the month that his future messages would be audited, or asking Quon himself to redact the transcript of his messages.”

In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the 9th Circuit, holding that the circuit court’s opinion suffered from “analytic errors,” and that the search did not violate Quon’s Fourth Amendment rights.  Noting that it has “repeatedly refused to declare that only the least intrusive search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,” the Supreme Court found the search to be reasonable, given the Department’s legitimate business purpose in conducting the audit and its attempts to redact from review messages sent by Quon while off duty.

Perhaps even more anticipated than the ultimate outcome of the case (the Ninth Circuit is frequently reversed) was whether the Court would use the opportunity to erase confusion about its precedents on workplace privacy for public employees, and update previous holdings for the information age.  This question was answered, disappointingly many will feel, in the first sentence of Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court, which states that “[t]hough the case touches issues of far-reaching significance, the Court concludes it can be resolved by settled principles determining when a search is reasonable.”  Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, chastised the Court for refusing to tackle the need to revise legal standards in light of emerging technologies. 

Although the Quon court vindicated the City’s search, most employers—public or private—would prefer to avoid a trial, followed by two rounds of appellate practice ending at the Supreme Court.  Simple, common sense procedures by Police Department management may have prevented the litigation from occurring in the first place.  Had the Department updated its written communications policy to include pager transmissions, disseminated that policy to officers, and enforced its written policy in a consistent manner, the lawsuit may have been averted.  Consistent enforcement of disseminated written policies is the best defense to an employee’s claim that he or she had expectations that differed from that policy.  While Quon may be interesting reading for lawyers, avoiding Quon-type litigation is certainly more interesting for employers.

This entry was submitted by Stephen Coppolo, a member of the Firm’s Employment Counseling and Litigation Practice Group, and Samantha Yanco, a summer associate with Nelson, Kinder, Mosseau & Saturley.

New Use of Old Policy Starts New Clock for Timely Workplace Race Discrimination Claims Based on Disparate-Impact Theory

June 9th, 2010

A recent opinion by the Supreme Court clarified the time limit for bringing workplace race discrimination claims based on a disparate-impact theory of discrimination. In a unanimous opinion issued on May 24, 2010 in Lewis v. City of Chicago, the Court held that African-Americans who had taken the exam to become Chicago firefighters and earned scores in the “qualified” range, but not the “well qualified” range brought a timely disparate-impact claim because their claim was within the deadline of when the City applied those classifications, even if it would have been time-barred as to when the City first established the classification.

The Court highlighted that Title VII prohibits employers from using a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. The Court found that the City of Chicago had used the classifications from its 1995 firefighter exam each time that it selected applicants to advance from the eligibility list, which it did multiple times during the subsequent years. When it “used” the list, the City committed a new discriminatory act. Because the plaintiff class filed discrimination charges with the EEOC within 300 days after one such unlawful practice occurred, it was not time-barred under the Title VII requirements for a timely complaint.

The opinion noted that the effect of this opinion could allow for workplace race discrimination lawsuits challenging employment practices that had been in place for years, during which time the employer’s evidence of the business necessity behind the challenged policy might become diluted. Nevertheless, the Court found this to be the meaning intended under the disparate-impact section of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).

Massachusetts House Votes to “Ban the Box.”

May 27th, 2010

A common employment application question may soon become a thing of the past in Massachusetts, as the House voted 138 to 17 to pass legislation banning employment applications from inquiring into criminal history, and taking a stand to “ban the box” as activists have advocated for years. Briefly, the House approved a provision that would seal records of felony convictions, making them unavailable to potential employers, after 10 years. The provision would also seal records of misdemeanor convictions after 5 years. In addition, the House voted to “ban the box,” adding a provision that would ban employers from including questions in their job application forms about a person’s criminal background.

But there are some loop holes. First, records for some crimes, such as murder and manslaughter, would never be sealed from a criminal background (or CORI) check under this House bill. Second, while employers will not be able to ask about criminal records on application forms, they will be permitted to ask during a job interview.

Whether this is a good idea remains to be seen. People in Massachusetts still remember the Christa Worthington case, where the estate of a woman murdered by a trash collector sued the trash collection company for failing to conduct criminal background checks that would have disclosed the collector’s violent past. While reintegration of convicts back into productive society can serve to reduce crime generally, hiring an individual with a violent past can serve to increase an employer’s potential liability, not to mention the risk to unsuspecting customers and other members of the public.

The state’s Senate passed a similar version of the bill with a few variations, such as including sex crimes among the list of crimes exempted from the sealed record requirement. That said, a bill with these general provisions will likely be passed into law soon, and only time will tell whether society will be better off when it decides to “ban the box.”

Christopher Vrountas, Chair of the Employment Counseling and Litigation Practice Group, contributed this entry.

Massachusetts Non-Compete Agreements Bill Advances in Legislature

May 19th, 2010

After undergoing some revisions, a bill codifying the scope of allowable provisions in Massachusetts non-compete agreements is advancing on Beacon Hill. The legislation is a mixed bag for Bay State employers, in some places simply codifying common law doctrines, but elsewhere pulling back from restrictions found reasonable by the courts. In some areas, the legislation could actually assist employers by removing uncertainty as to the reasonableness of a non-compete’s terms, thus avoiding a costly legal battle over reasonableness down the road. The following is a list of notable provisions in the bill:

The Good

• The bill does not alter current law allowing prohibitions on a former employee soliciting customers or employees to jump ship to a competing employer.

• The bill’s provisions do not apply to restrictive covenants entered into as part of the sale of a business or assets of a business.

The Bad

• Non-competition agreements cannot be enforced against employees making less than $75,000 per year (adjusted upward by $1,500 for each year after the bill’s passage). This provision could be troublesome to employers who have key employees earning under the $75,000 threshold, especially in the central and western parts of the state where salaries are lower than in Boston.

• The bill creates a strict one-year limit for the duration on non-competition agreements, and further provides that non-competes lasting six months or less are presumptively reasonable. While this provision may cause difficulties for employers that have relied on non-competes lasting longer than six months, the bill could actually assist employers by making it easier to enforce agreements lasting six months or less.

• The bill provides that continued employment is not sufficient consideration for a non-competition agreement presented to the employee after employment has commenced. Instead, the bill states that consideration of ten percent of the employee’s annual salary will be deemed “presumptively reasonable” compensation. Thus delay could be costly.

• The bill mandates that employees be given notice that of a required non-competition agreement seven days’ prior to commencement of employment, or when a written job offer is communicated, whichever is earlier. If a job offer is oral, the prospective employee must either be simultaneously told of the required non-competition agreement, or be provided written notice prior to his or her resignation from a current job. If the bill passes, employers would be well advised not to rely on the “prior to resignation” provision, as a new hire’s decision to quit his or her old job a few days early could invalidate your non-compete agreement.

The Ugly

• The bill mandates that a court shall award attorneys’ fees and costs to an employee if the court declines to enforce a material restriction in the agreement or finds that the employer acted in bad faith, among other reasons. There is a provision allowing for the employer to be awarded attorneys’ fees, but such an award is left to the court’s discretion and requires the challenged provisions to be those deemed “presumptively reasonable,” the agreement to have been enforced without substantial modification, and the employee to have acted in bad faith. This is an extremely high standard for an employer to meet.

• The bill allows a court to refuse to enforce any provision in a non-competition agreement, even those deemed presumptively reasonable, in “extraordinary circumstances,” or “where otherwise necessary to prevent injustice or an unduly harsh result.” Expect these phrases to become standard in the lexicon of plaintiffs’ attorneys, as their vagueness could essentially serve as a catch-all to override the bill’s provisions.

Stephen D. Coppolo, a member of the Employment Counseling and Litigation Practice Group, contributed this report.

Federal Court Rules Against Employee in Title VII Discrimination Case

May 18th, 2010

Despite a rise in workplace discrimination lawsuits, results remain the same: Angel David Morales-Vallellanes had slayed Goliath and had won a $500,000 jury verdict (later reduced to $300,000) in a Title VII discrimination case in which he alleged gender and retaliation discrimination by his former employer, John E. Potter (the United States Postmaster General).  On appeal in Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, however, Potter argued that Morales did not deserve any award because he failed to prove that he suffered any materially adverse employment action under Title VII.

Morales brought a workplace discrimination lawsuit and raised three main claims against Potter (all alleging Title VII discrimination): (1) the USPS did not enforce its coffee and lunch break policy in an equal and nondiscriminatory matter because certain female employees were, at times, permitted to take longer breaks; (2) the USPS temporarily transferred Morales’s preferred duties and responsibilities to a female employee and assigned Morales to other duties in his job description; and (3) after Morales filed a complaint with the EEOC, the USPS changed the days off allotted for a certain Distribution and Window Clerk position when it was posted for bidding.

The court examined this Title VII discrimination case and evaluated Morales’s claims and concluded that none of the alleged incidents rose to the level of an adverse employment decision, which is required to support a discrimination claim.  Nor were any of Morales’s claims sufficient to dissuade a reasonable employee from filing or supporting a charge of discrimination, which is required to support a retaliation claim.  The court explained that, “even if two female employees were permitted to take longer breaks than Morales on account of their gender, such selective enforcement of the breaks policy had no material effect on Morales’s employment.”  The court recognized that being reassigned to disfavored duties may in some instances constitute discrimination or retaliation, but Morales’s temporary assignment to a duty that was part of his job description, and not any more or less prestigious or arduous than the other duties, did not rise to that level.  Finally, the court found that the altering of a job posting for a job that Morales wanted (changing the rest days from Saturday and Sunday to Thursday and Sunday) was not “a materially significant disadvantage” that would dissuade a reasonable employee from bringing or supporting a claim of discrimination.

This case illustrates that, despite the rising number of workplace discrimination lawsuits (including gender discrimination and retaliation cases such as this one), a court stills hold an employee and his/her allegations to the requirements of the law.  As the court stated, “work places are rarely idyllic retreats, and the mere fact that an employee is displeased by an employer’s act or omission does not elevate that act or omission to the level of a materially adverse employment action.”  Moreover, “minor disruptions in the workplace, including ‘petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners,’ fail to qualify” as adverse employment actions.  Title VII discrimination cases, indeed, are increasing, but the standards courts employ to adjudicate them remain consistently high.

Conflicting Disabilities May Put Employer in the ‘Doghouse’

May 11th, 2010

Emily Kysel has a rare and potentially fatal allergy to paprika. She is so sensitive to the spice that she had a serious attack and had to leave work after she smelled the buffalo wings that her co-worker was eating a few cubicles away. At one point, she nearly died from eating chili containing paprika. Recognizing Ms. Kysel’s disability, her employer, the City of Indianapolis, agreed to allow her to have a service dog in the office. The dog, a golden retriever named Penny, was trained to jump on Kysel whenever she smelled paprika. She cost Kysel $10,000. On the very first day that Penny went to work with Kysel, one of Kysel’s co-workers suffered an asthma attack because she is allergic to dogs. The City informed Ms. Kysel that afternoon that Penny was no longer welcome in the office. Kysel was offered indefinite unpaid leave if she felt she could not work without the dog. Kysel then filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging that her employer violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by failing to accommodate her disability. A lawyer for the City thinks that it has done enough to accommodate Kysel’s disability, including barring employees from eating food that contain paprika at their desks. Kysel disagrees, pointing out that the City allows blind employees to bring their service animals to work.

To view the related article as published in the New York Times online, click here.

San Diego Employer Gets ICE’d

May 10th, 2010

The manager and owner of French Gourmet, a San Diego bakery, were arraigned in federal district court on April 21, 2010, on charges that they conspired to engage in a pattern or practice of hiring and continuing to employee unauthorized workers, a misdemeanor, in addition to 14 felony counts, including making false statements and shielding undocumented alien employees from detection. If convicted, the manager and owner face a maximum of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine on each count. The indictment also seeks criminal forfeiture of proceeds gained from the restaurant’s unlawful activities. According to the indictment, the resaurant’s managers certified on the firm’s Employment Verification Forms (I-9) that the documents they examined appeared to be genuine, and to the best of the their knowledge, the employees listed on the I-9 were eligible to work in the United States. The managers then put the illegal workers on the company’s payroll and paid them by paycheck until they received letters advising them that the Social Security numbers of the employees did not match the names of the rightful owners of the Social Security numbers. The indictment alleges that the restaurant then conspired to pay the undocumented employees in cash until the workers produced a new set of employment documents with different Social Security numbers. The criminal case against the restaurant and its managers is supported by employee and payroll records seized by ICE agents in a May 2008 search of the restaurant, which also resulted in the arrest of 18 undocumented workers. The lesson to employers: ensure compliance with I-9 requirements and establish an I-9 policy that includes completion and retention of Form I-9 for all employees, a strict policy against the employment of individuals who do not provide the proper eligibility documents for Form I-9, periodic reverification of employees, I-9 training for all employees who are part of the hiring process, and regular auditing of employees’ status.

Muslim woman denied job at Detroit McDonald’s files complaint

April 21st, 2010

A Muslim woman filed a discrimination complaint against the McDonald’s claiming that she was denied a job at a one of their Detroit restaurants because of her religion and ethnicity. The woman wears an Islamic head scarf known as a hijab as part of her religious customs. According to the Complainant, the McDonald’s manager with whom she interviewed asked her about her nationality and whether she had to wear the hijab, and proceeded to tell her that she would not be able to wear the hijab while she was working. Ultimately, McDonald’s hired someone else. This is not the first time that a Michigan McDonald’s has been under fire for discriminating against Muslim individuals. In July 2008, two Muslim women complained after a manager at a McDonald’s restaurant in Dearborn said they could not wear Islamic headscarves at work. Their attorney filed suit and he said today that the case may go to trial in a couple of months. McDonald’s director of operations responded that the restaurant strictly prohibits any form of discrimination. A McDonald’s representative said that the Company never intends to offend anyone and it requires its employees to comply with all applicable anti-discrimination laws.

For more information, see Nation’s Restaurant News.

Summy-Long v. Pennsylvania State University et al.

April 16th, 2010

The U.S. District Court, (M.D. Pennsylvania) held that in Title VII wage discrimination claim, under the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, if plaintiff faculty member can demonstrate that her wages were the result of a discriminatory decision to pay her less than her male co-workers, she may recover for each paycheck received during the Title VII 300-day statute of limitations period and need not show that a discriminatory pay-setting decision occurred within the 300-day period. The court also holds, however, that the Fair Pay Act, which states that each paycheck paid pursuant to a discriminatory pay structure is an independent, actionable employment practice, precludes application of the continuing violation theory to support recovery by plaintiff of amounts attributable to discrimination represented in paychecks issued prior to the 300 day limitation period. The court also discusses application of the Discovery Rule and Equitable Tolling to extend the 300 day limitation period and the application of the Fair Pay Act to Plaintiff’s Title IX, Sec. 1983 and 1985 claims.